EXPLORING THE LINK BETWEEN
DOMESTIC CONFLICTS AND NEGOTIATION

FAILURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Russell Korobkin*
In "Barriers to Progress at the Negotiation Table: Internal Conflicts
Among Israelis and Among Palestinians,"' Professor Robert Mnookin and
associates Ehud Eiran and Sreemati Mitter provide a detailed description of the
fundamental internal schisms within Israeli and Palestinian societies that complicate the conflict between them. In Israel, the domestic conflict concerns the
West Bank settlements, home to 250,000 Israeli Jews, established after Israel
captured the region from Jordan in the 1967 Six-Day War. Among Palestinians, the primary internal conflict concerns the claimed "right of return" to
Israel of the Palestinians who fled Israel during the 1947-1948 war and their
descendents-approximately four million people in all.2
It is indisputable that the West Bank settlements and the right of return are
central issues in Israeli and Palestinian political life. Mnookin et al. demonstrate this fact through their compelling historical narrative and examination of
modern-day politics between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.
What is less clear is whether there is a causal relationship between these
"behind the table" conflicts and the failure of Israel and the Palestinians to
successfully negotiate a final status agreement "across the table." The authors
claim that the internal conflicts provide the "essential explanation" for the
ongoing failure of the Israelis and Palestinians to end their dispute.3 Although
the authors do not explain precisely what they mean by this, the statement
seems to suggest one of two possible beliefs. The stronger possible claim is
that, were it not for these internal conflicts, Israel and the Palestinians would be
able to negotiate a final status agreement. The weaker possible claim is that
unless and until these internal conflicts are resolved, a final-status agreement
will be impossible.
Although the authors convincingly demonstrate the depth of the internal
conflicts among both Israelis and Palestinians, their claim concerning the centrality of these conflicts to the ongoing impasse is defended quite lightly. This
is too bad, because the claim is both eminently plausible and certainly contestable. In this response, I will attempt to evaluate this claim. Building on my
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recent work on negotiation theory as applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,4
I will argue in this essay that there are two other very plausible but-for causes
of the observed negotiation failures that, together or separately, make it far
from clear that the domestic conflicts are, in fact, the essential determinates of
bargaining failure.
I.

Is THERE A "BARGAINING ZONE"?

To begin any analysis of a negotiation problem, the best place to start is
usually to consider each party's "reservation point," meaning the maximum
amount of concessions that each party can make and still prefer a negotiated
agreement to impasse.5 In a negotiation context in which many incommensurable issues are involved, each party's reservation point might be defined by one
or more packages of terms. So, for example, if Alan is in a dispute with Ben
and would be willing to give Ben six apples (but not seven) to settle the dispute, or four apples and three oranges (but not five apples and three oranges or
four apples and four oranges), we can say that Alan has a reservation point of
six apples or, alternatively, of four apples and three oranges. We could also
therefore say that a settlement proposal that called for Alan to give Ben five
apples therefore would "exceed" Alan's reservation point-meaning that such a
proposal would be more desirable to Alan than impasse-as would a proposal
that called for Alan to give Ben two apples and three oranges. In contrast, a
proposal that would require Alan to give Ben six apples and four oranges
would not exceed Alan's reservation price, meaning that Alan would never
consent to such an agreement.
If there is at least one package of deal terms that exceeds the reservation
points of both parties, we can say that there is a "bargaining zone, ' 6 which
means an agreement is possible (although not guaranteed). If there is no set of
deal terms that satisfies this condition, we can say there is no bargaining zone.
The lack of a bargaining zone will always cause negotiation failure (at least
absent a mistake by one of the parties), because for any potential set of deal
terms at least one party would prefer impasse to agreement, and simple selfinterest thus makes an agreement impossible.
This analytical framework is easy to employ when each negotiating party
is a single, unitary actor. As the Mnookin et al. article well demonstrates, however, Israel and Palestine are far from unitary actors. Each is a collection of
groups with different and sometimes contradictory interests. In this situation,
one way to evaluate whether there is a bargaining zone is to base each side's
reservation point on the basis of the preferences of a majority of its
constituents.
Mnookin et al. appear to believe that, determining reservation points of
non-unitary actors in this way, there is a bargaining zone between "Israel" and
'
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"Palestine." The authors observe that a final-status agreement based on Israeli
relinquishment of most or all of the West Bank settlements, Palestinian renunciation of the right of return, and a division of Jerusalem would "serv[e] the
interests of most Israelis and most Palestinians." 7 (I will refer to these terms as
the "Geneva Proposal," since they are close to those put forward in the
"Geneva Accord" negotiated in 2003 by former Israeli cabinet minister Yossi
Belin and former Palestinian minister Yasser Abed Rabbo but rejected by the
leadership of both sides.8 ) Mnookin et al. point out that Israelis with a material
interest in maintaining the settlements are the religiously motivated settlers,
who make up a small minority of Israel's 6.5 million citizens. 9 A greater percentage of Palestinians are refugees, or the descendents of refugees, but the
authors remind us that, according to a much-discussed poll, only about ten percent of them would actually wish to exercise the right of return to Israel
proper.' The authors contend that these minority groups within the Israeli and
Palestinian camps are blocking an agreement that the majorities on either side
would be willing accept.
Perhaps so. But there are reasons to question whether the Geneva Proposal does, in fact, exceed the reservation points of Israel and of Palestine, as
determined on the basis of majority preferences. Some Israelis who have no
theological commitment to maintaining West Bank settlements would oppose a
peace agreement that required conceding all of the West Bank settlements on
security grounds. It is true that, with the demise of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, an
Arab land invasion from Israel's east seems extremely unlikely," but West
Bank territory does give psychological protection to a nation that has been
attacked by its neighbors on numerous occasions and is only nine miles wide at
its narrowest point.
Many more Israelis with no spiritual commitment to the West Bank would
oppose abandoning the settlements unless and until the Palestinian Authority
demonstrates the will and ability to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel from
its territory. It is important to keep in mind that an agreement by the Palestinian Authority to renounce the right of return has no immediate material value to
Israel, because under the status quo no Palestinian refugees are able to emigrate
to Israel. Israel's primary incentive to agree to the Geneva Proposal would be
the promise of peaceful coexistence that a final-status agreement would imply.
A transaction in which one party's short term obligation (i.e., withdrawal from
the settlements) is traded for the other party's long term commitment (i.e., ending the armed struggle against Israel and preventing terrorism now and in the
future) creates the risk of moral hazard. 2 That is, the party with the long-term
obligation might shirk in the performance of its responsibilities after receiving
its benefit.
7 Mnookin et al., supra note 1, at 300.
8 See Text of the Geneva Accord, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticle
En.jhtml?itemNo=351461 (last updated Jan. 12, 2003).

9 Mnookin et al, supra note 1, at 310.
10 See Id. at 338 tbl.3.
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Israelis have long questioned the willingness of the Palestinians to ever
actually live in peace with Israel. 13 These doubts were exacerbated by the failure of the Palestinian Authority, first under Yasser Arafat and now under Mahmoud Abbas, to take armed action against Palestinian militants to prevent
terrorist attacks on Israel. 14 This inaction became visible after Israel's withdrawal from Gaza last summer. Not long after the Israeli Defense Forces
("IDF") turned Gaza over to Palestinian control, militants showered dozens of
Qassam rockets on southern Israel, injuring a handful of Israelis and provoking
a military response by the IDF."5 The unwillingness or inability (or combination of the two) of the Palestinian Authority to prevent such attacks at a time
when the Palestinians have an incentive to convince Israel that real peace is
possible in order to win further territorial concessions 16 makes Israelis understandably concerned about whether sacrificing the West Bank settlements as
part of a final status agreement would yield real benefits. The recent victory of
Hamas in Palestinian elections can only further exacerbate this concern. Even
Israelis with no messianic desire to maintain control of the West Bank would
oppose giving up the settlements if they felt that taking that step would not lead
to a true and stable peace. At a minimum, relinquishing the settlements means
and relocating the settlers into Israel proper would
giving up a bargaining chip,
17
be extremely expensive.
It is also unclear whether a majority of Palestinians would prefer a final
status agreement that included Israel's concession of the entire West Bank in
return for, among other things, a renunciation of the right of return. A coldly
rational view of the current "facts on the ground" certainly suggest that such an
agreement would be a tremendous improvement for all Palestinians other than
(or, perhaps even including) the small number who actually hold out hope of
some day returning to their former homes in Israel proper. But the analysis is
not as obvious when the emotional content of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and
the changing demographics of the Holy Land are taken into account.
Concerning the first point, as Mnookin et al. explain in great deal, the
displacement of Palestinians from Israel proper during the 1948-1949 ArabIsraeli war is a fundamental element of the Palestinian historical narrative. To
many Palestinians who have no interest in ever living in Israel, renouncing the
right of return would mean accepting as permanent what they see as the fundamental injustice of their national movement. Swallowing such a bitter pill has
real, if intangible costs. Mnookin et al. attribute the internal conflict among
13
14
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Palestinians over the right of return to "profound differences in their interests
and circumstances." 8 If this is the source of the internal conflict, then it is
indeed the case that only a minority would oppose trading the right of return
claim for a Palestinian state in the entire West Bank and Gaza. But if the
source of the internal conflict is instead ideology and emotion, it is quite
unclear whether the majority of Palestinians would in fact be willing make that
trade.
The second point is that, even if bartering the claim to a right of return for
the West Bank settlements would be preferable to the status quo for most Palestinians, many Palestinians believe their negotiating leverage will be greater in
the future than it is today because the birthrate among Palestinians is much
higher than that of Israeli Jews. 19 Today, in the land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, Jews slightly outnumber Arabs, but this will change
soon-probably within the next decade.2 ° In addition, it is possible that by
mid-century, Arabs in Israel proper-now approximately twenty percent of the
population-could become a majority. 2' As time progresses, separation from
Palestinians will become more and more necessary for Israel if it is to maintain
its democratic and Jewish character. Some Palestinians, and perhaps many,
believe that sacrifices they would have to make today to achieve peace would
be greater than the sacrifices they would need to make tomorrow and thus prefer not to have peace today.22 The recent victory in Palestinian elections by
Hamas, which claims to have no inclination to discuss peace with Israel, can be
interpreted as evidence that this perspective is widespread.
To summarize, then, although the Geneva Proposal might be preferable to
the status quo for the majority of Israelis and the majority of Palestinians, there
are reasons to suspect that this might not be the case. If it is not the case, it
would be difficult to blame the continuing failure of Middle-East peace efforts
on conflicts between majorities and minorities on each side of the bargaining
table. The better explanation would be that there simply is no bargaining zone
such that both sides would prefer the Geneva Proposal to the status quo.
II.

HARD BARGAINING

This section suggests a different explanation for impasse between the
Israelis and the Palestinians: that there is a bargaining zone, but rather than
agreeing to a set of terms that minimally exceeds its reservation point, one or
both sides chooses to demand an even more desirable set of terms than the
Mnookin et al., supra note 1, at 340.
See, e.g., Elia Zureik, Demography and Transfer: Israel's Road to Nowhere, 24 THIRD
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other side will accept. I refer to this possible cause of impasse as "hard"
bargaining.
The existence of a potential agreement that exceeds the reservation points
of both disputants is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the parties to
reach agreement. Before agreeing to any set of terms that falls within the bargaining zone, a negotiating party must evaluate the risks and benefits of holding out for even more desirable terms; that is, it must decide whether to adopt
the "soft" bargaining strategy of agreeing to any possible deal minimally superior to the status quo and thus reaping some benefit, or the "hard" bargaining
strategy of demanding terms that are much more desirable. In choosing
between these approaches, each disputant must compare the value of the excellent terms that it might obtain with a hard strategy to that of the minimally
acceptable terms that a soft strategy would yield and discount that marginal
benefit of the hard strategy by the marginal risk of impasse that it carries. It
should then select the strategy with the greater risk-adjusted expected value.
Assume for the moment that there is a bargaining zone and that the
Geneva Proposal lies within it. Even though Israel would prefer a final-status
agreement on these terms to ongoing hostilities, it would undoubtedly prefer to
end the conflict on terms even more favorable to it, such as keeping control of
most of its settlements. Rational Israeli leaders would therefore compare the
potential benefits of refusing to concede these settlements and winning Palestinian acquiescence nonetheless to the risk that taking such an aggressive negotiating position would cause an impasse that would otherwise be avoided.
Palestinian leaders, for their part, would not only need to determine that the
Geneva Proposal exceeds its reservation point, but also whether the potential
benefits that might be gained by demanding more than what the Geneva Proposal would give them-perhaps a right of return for some percentage of the
refugees, Israeli payments to refugees, etc.-would outweigh the risk that making additional demands would cause impasse and the leave the Palestinians
worse off than they otherwise would be.
A negotiator is more likely to believe that a hard strategy will be successful if it believes its adversary is more disadvantaged than it is by the status quo,
because under these circumstances the adversary is more likely to make concessions. It is quite possible that both disputants in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have just such a belief.
Today, Israel controls much of the West Bank settlements, all of Jerusalem, and the Temple Mount. Palestinians might claim the right of return, but
they can't exercise it. Their territory is divided by Israeli occupation and their
economy is in tatters. From this perspective, it would be sensible for Israelis to
believe that a final-status agreement would provide the Palestinians with a relatively greater benefit, and therefore that the Palestinians should be willing to
make relatively greater concessions to secure such an agreement.
On the other hand, as described above, demographic trends in the region
favor the Palestinians. Palestinians might believe that rational Israelis will recognize that these trends will cause their position to grow weaker over time, and
thus that Israel will make concessions to secure an agreement. Israel's recent
withdrawal from Gaza can be viewed as an Israeli attempt to undermine this
mindset on the part of the Palestinians by demonstrating that unilateral action
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can change the demographic outlook.2 3 If Israel continues to pursue a policy of
unilateral disengagement, it could conceivably withdraw from and turn over to
the Palestinian Authority additional portions of the West Bank with large Palestinian concentrations to avoid the specter of a Palestinian majority within the
territory it controls while maintaining many or even most of the Jewish settlements there.
When a hard strategy is successful, not only does the party implementing
it get "more" out of the agreement, the other side achieves "less." Thus, when
deciding whether to implement a hard or a soft strategy, a party is more likely
to determine that the risk-adjusted expected value of the hard strategy is greater
if, rather than being concerned entirely with the benefits that would inure to it
as the result of an agreement, it places a positive value on the other side not
achieving what it wants. There is little doubt that state of affairs exists in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That is, both parties have what can be called
malevolent utility functions. The long period of mutual hatred and the amount
of blood that has been shed on both sides make it inevitable that each would
prefer a final status agreement that minimizes the other's happiness.
The events following Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza settlements provide an illustrative example. Rather than accept Israel's relinquishments of the
Gaza settlements gracefully, Palestinian factions (including Hamas, Islamic
Jihad, and the Fatah-affiliated Al Aksa Martyr's Brigade) declared "victory" in
an attempt to heap humiliation on Israel. an Israelis were in no mood to accept a
peace that would leave the Palestinians ecstatic. A month after the IDF left
Gaza, New York Times foreign affairs columnist Thomas Friedman wrote that
the "Israeli majority wants a deal with the Palestinians, but they want a mean,
'
tough, hard-bargainer to negotiate it. They have had enough with nice guys. "25
Finally, a negotiating party is more likely to choose a hard strategy over a
soft one in the absence of social norms that point toward a particular set of deal
terms. When social convention makes a particular set of agreement terms
highly salient, negotiators often believe that those terms are fair and will willingly assent to them.26 In contrast, when there is no social consensus that
makes a certain set of deal terms focal, negotiators are more likely to employ a
hard strategy to avoid the risk of an outcome that leaves them believing they
received less than their "fair share." Imagine a commercial negotiation concerning a commonly traded commodity, where the seller's reservation point is
ten dollars and the buyer's reservation point is twenty dollars. If the market
price of the commodity in question is thirteen dollars, both parties are likely to
agree to a transaction at that price. If the commodity is unique and there is no
identifiable market price, however, a price that both sides can agree is "fair" is
23 See Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 4, at 20-21. Sharon has observed that leaving Gaza
has the effect of producing demographic benefits for Israel. See James Bennett, Sharon
Advances Toward Removal of Some Settlers, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2004, at Al.
24 See Steven Erlanger, Gazans Revel as They Sift Through Ex-Settlements, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2005, at Al.
25 Thomas L. Friedman, Talking World Affairs, TimesSelect, Sept. 27, 2005, http://friedman.page.nytimes.com/?8hpib (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
26 See Korobkin, supra note 5, at 1825-29.
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more likely to be illusive. In this situation, the seller is more likely to demand
nineteen dollars and the buyer to refuse to raise its offer above eleven dollars.
The unique issues raised by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the
differences between Israeli and Palestinian cultures, results in the lack of any
universal justice norms that can coordinate the bargaining behavior of the disputants. Israel can assert that justice requires the preservation of the Jewishness of Israel, which implies the renunciation of the Palestinians' claimed right
of return. It can also assert that justice demands a minimum of people of any
nationality be evicted from their homes, suggesting Israel should keep the largest settlements closest to Israel. The Palestinians can assert that justice requires
refugees be repatriated and they obtain complete sovereignty over their territory, as defined by United Nations resolutions. There is no neutral method of
resolving these competing and mutually exclusive sets of claims.
If both parties adopt hard bargaining strategies, impasse is a likely result
even if there is a viable bargaining zone. An agreement is even unlikely, however, if only one party adopts such a strategy, both because the demands of the
hard-bargaining party might not exceed the reservation point of the softer-bargaining party and because the softer-bargaining party might believe the hardbargaining party is unfairly attempting to exploit it, and for that reason refuse to
continue negotiations.
In December 2000, President Bill Clinton proposed a final-status peace
plan that would have established a Palestinian state to Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. 27 Barak accepted the proposal; Arafat rejected it.2 8 Why Arafat turned down the historic proposal is a
matter of conjecture, but one recent explanation offered by Arafat confidants
suggests it was part of a hard bargaining strategy. According to Mamduh Nofal
and Yasser Abed Rabbo, Saudi officials told Arafat to hold out because they
could get him a better deal from the incoming President Bush, the son of their
"friend." 29 Arafat's tactics provoked an immediate backlash against the peace
process by an Israeli electorate that felt its prime minister was playing the fool.
Two months later, Barak lost reelection in a landslide to Ariel Sharon, who had
criticized the concessions that Barak had indicated a willingness to make.
To summarize, even if a bargaining zone exists, strategic decisions to
adopt hard bargaining approaches can cause impasse. In the specific context of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many factors support the hypothesis that such
strategic behavior explains Israeli refusals to relinquish the West Bank and Palestinian refusals to renounce the right of return, and the subsequent failure of
the parties to agree to the Geneva Proposal.
III.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

The prior sections suggest two alternative explanations to internal conflicts for the failure of Israel and the Palestinians to negotiate a final-status
peace agreement: (1) the absence of a set of terms that exceeds the reservation
points of both sides; and (2) the adoption of hard bargaining strategies by one
27 See Ross, supra note 13, at 712-58.
28 Id. at 753-58.

29 Samuels, supra note 22, at 77.
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or both parties that have the effect of obscuring the existence of a bargaining
zone. If either of these explanations is correct, internal conflicts amongst Israelis or amongst Palestinians are not a but-for cause of the impasse; that is, even
in the absence of Israeli defenders of the West Bank settlements and Palestinian
adherents of the right of return claim, the Middle East conflict would continue.
This does not mean, of course, that internal conflicts on one or both sides
of the bargaining table are not a sufficient cause of the impasse. Although
other causes of bargaining failure might exist, internal conflicts could constitute
an independent barrier to peace. One possibility is that there is no bargaining
zone between Israel and the Palestinians at present, but that even if the parties
were to determine that the terms of the Geneva Proposal exceed their reservation points, internal conflicts would still prevent the negotiation of a final-status
agreement. Another possibility is that strategic hard bargaining by the parties
prevents agreement, but that even if the disputants wished to adopt softer positions in an effort to reach agreement, internal conflicts would prevent them
from doing so. If either of these explanations is correct, the internal conflicts
would be a critical impediment to peace even if they are not the only impediment, and resolving these conflicts would be a necessary step to the negotiation
of a final-status agreement.
To evaluate the claim that internal conflicts impede agreement, it is necessary to consider what mechanism or mechanisms a minority of Israelis or of
Palestinians with strong opposition to the Geneva Proposal could prevent the
adoption of that proposal, assuming that majorities on both sides favored doing
so.
Israel's government is a parliamentary democracy with multiple political
parties and competitive elections. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily the case
that if the majority of Israeli citizens favored the Geneva Proposal the government would sign on. Assuming majority support for that proposal, the relatively dovish Labor Party and its left-of-center allies would undoubtedly favor
its enactment. These parties currently hold only 53 of 120 seats in the Knesset,
however, so their support would not be enough.
The far-right and religious parties, which would certainly oppose conceding the settlements, hold only twenty-seven Knesset seats. Right-of-center
Likud holds the remaining forty seats, 3 0 and the recent political upheaval in
Israel strongly suggests that it too would oppose ceding the settlements even in
return for a renunciation of the right of return. When Ariel Sharon championed
last year's withdrawal from the Gaza settlements and invited Labor into a unity
government with Likud to secure the votes necessary to approve the plan, 3' he
had to drag his Likud colleagues along kicking and screaming, and the party's
rank and file cast an advisory vote against the plan. 32 Former Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, a staunch opponent of the Gaza withdrawal, launched an
For a breakdown of the Knesset seats by party, see http://www.knesset.gov.il (follow
"Entrance" hyperlink; then follow "Current Knesset Members" hyperlink; then follow "Factions" hyperlink).
31 See Steven Erlanger, New Coalition Led by Sharon is Approved in Parliament, N.Y.
TIMES, January 11, 2005, at A3.
32 See Andres Martinez, One State of Two, Israelis and PalestiniansShare the Same Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at A20.
30
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effort to unseat Sharon as Likud's leader and, whether or not Netanyahu would
have succeeded, his insurgency helped convince Sharon to bolt Likud and
found the new Kadima party in late 2005. Withdrawing 8500 settlers from
Gaza, which has no religious significance, and withdrawing 250,000 settlers
from the West Bank are propositions of very different magnitudes. The significant Likud opposition to the former implies there is almost no chance that party
would ever agree to the latter.
If distribution of power in the Knesset were static, then, it might be the
case that a minority of Israelis could use their political power to block an agreement that the majority favored. But political power in Israel is quite dynamic, a
fact that recent events accentuate. Prior to Sharon's stroke in January 2006,
polls tracking voter preferences for the March 2006 Knesset elections showed
his just-established Kadima party with a comfortable lead.3 3 As this article goes
to press, Israeli elections are only a month away and Kadima remains the favorite to win a plurality of the vote. The best interpretation of Kadima's popularity is that most Israelis favor withdrawing from at least some additional
settlements: if Sharon did not want to abandon more settlements, he would
have had no reason to leave Likud and found Kadima, and if the public did not
support him in this endeavor, Kadima would not poll so well. This extremely
quick political shift certainly suggests that if a majority of Israelis were to favor
the Geneva Proposal, a realignment of Israeli political parties that would provide a Knesset majority favorable to that proposal would probably ensue.
Thus, there is good evidence indicating that if the majority of Israelis wished to
accept the Geneva Proposal, and if the Palestinians were also willing to accept
that proposal, an Israeli minority hostile to that plan would not be able to block
its acceptance through the political process, at least not for very long.
If it seems unlikely that opponents of the Geneva Proposal could block its
adoption through parliamentary means if a majority of Israeli's favored it, it
also seems unlikely that such a minority could exercise a veto through extralegal means such as violent resistance or civil disobedience. Despite fears of
violence, 34 protests of the Gaza withdrawal were mostly peaceful. 35 Many settlers vowed not to leave, but by the deadline imposed by the Israeli government
most did. 36 Several thousand protesters from outside Gaza moved in ahead of
the evacuation and refused to leave, 37 but the well-trained and well-organized
IDF removed them in a matter of days without bloodshed, surprising observers
33 Steven Erlanger, Sharon, Health an Issue, to Face Netanyahu, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
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handful of minor episodes of violence. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger & Dina Kraft, Israeli
Soldiers Pour in to Sway Gaza's Holdouts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at A1 (two Israeli
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36 See e.g., Erlanger & Kraft, supra note 35.
31 See, e.g., Erlanger & Myre, supra note 35.
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with its speed and efficiency. 38 Much was written about the possibility that
soldiers, whose officer ranks are disproportionately populated by settlers,
would refuse to follow orders to forcibly remove settlers, 39 but the fears of a
mutiny never came to pass. Israel's democratic institutions are strong, and the
IDF is well-disciplined and well-respected. If the order came to evacuate the
West Bank settlements, the Gaza experience suggests that there is little likelihood that opponents could stop its execution through the use of force. 4 °
The best chance that the religious-settler minority would have of stopping
Israel from agreeing to the Geneva Proposal (assuming, again, that a national
majority wished to enter such an agreement) would come from a more subtle
tactic than electoral or physical intransigence. By its vigorous opposition, such
a minority could conceivably convince the majority that such an agreement
would cause so much internal strife and ill-will that the psychological costs of a
divided Israeli public would exceed the benefits of peace with the Palestinians.
In other words, although the minority would be very unlikely to wield enough
power to stop a majority inclined to the Geneva Proposal from ratifying it, it
might be able to persuade the majority that withdrawal from the West Bank
settlements would produce a minority so permanently embittered that the game
would not be worth the candle. Even if the Israeli majority wants peace with
the Palestinians, the cost of a cold war with its countrymen might seem too
high.
The same analysis is plausible on the Palestinian side of the bargaining
table. That is, if a majority of Palestinians favored entering into an agreement
based on the Geneva Proposal, the threat of a deepening rift with the minority
that hopes to claim the right of return could cause the majority to disavow an
agreement that would require renouncing that claim.
The threat of violent opposition to a peace agreement is also more likely to
give Palestinian opponents an effective veto over the ratification of such an
agreement than the Israeli settlers could effectively wield. Militant Palestinian
groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which refuse to recognize Israel's
right to exist,4" would likely oppose such a concession. These groups are, of
course, well armed, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has avoided
direct confrontations with them since assuming office in January 2005, to the
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disappointment of American and Israeli leaders.4 2 It is unclear whether Abbas
could, in fact, disarm these groups. 43
The firepower of Palestinian militants opposed to any recognition of Israel
gives them two potential avenues of blocking even a peace agreement that a
majority of Palestinians would support. First, the possibility that entering into
such an agreement would touch off a Palestinian civil war could dissuade
Abbas from taking that step, even if he would otherwise be inclined to do so.
Second, since Israel's primary tangible inducement for entering into a peace
agreement presumably would be an end to terrorism and threats of violence,"4
the refusal to accept a final-status agreement on the part of a well-armed and
well-organized Palestinian minority might itself preclude Israel from entering
into or implementing the agreement, at least without demonstrable proof that
the Palestinian Authority could disarm that minority.
One could argue, however, that these impediments to a final-status agreement are not really the consequence of internal Palestinian conflict over the
right of return, but rather a consequence of the internal Palestinian conflict
over whether to recognize Israel's right to exist. Mnookin et al. point out that
the concepts are logically intertwined, in the sense that renouncing the right of
return logically requires recognition of Israel's existence, if not the morality of
its existence. But the two concepts are not one and the same. The possibility
of violence on the part of a minority of Palestinians that could threaten the
viability of an agreement in which the Palestinian Authority would renounce
the right of return would also threaten the viability of any final-status agreement-even one in which the Palestinians did not renounce the right of return.
Thus, even if the threat of violence by Palestinians who reject recognition of
Israel were sufficient to prevent the implementation of a final-status agreement,
it is still highly questionable whether it would be accurate to construe this set of
facts as evidence that the internal Palestinian conflict over the right of return,
per se, is impeding peace.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that the maintenance of West Bank settlements
divides public opinion in Israeli society, and that the maintenance of the
claimed right of return to Israel for Palestinian refugees divides public opinion
in Palestinian society. There is similarly no question that these divides, which
underscore differing aspirations for the future amongst both groups of people,
are central to the political life of both societies. The future health of each
nation requires that their respective internal conflicts be dampened, if not
resolved.
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It is not clear, however, whether these internal divisions are of critical
importance to understanding why the Israelis and Palestinians have failed to
make peace with each other, nor whether resolving them is of central importance to reaching a final-status agreement. One possible explanation of the
current impasse in the Middle East peace process is that most Israelis would not
be willing to sacrifice the West Bank settlements for a peace agreement (even if
they might for actual peace), and/or that most Palestinians would not be willing
to cede their claim to the right of return in return for a final status agreement.
A second explanation is that the Geneva Proposal exceeds the reservation
points of both sides, but one or both sides prefers to maintain a hard bargaining
posture in an effort to secure an even better set of terms.
It is also possible that a negotiated agreement proves elusive because,
although the majority of citizens on both sides would prefer to enter into an
agreement on the terms of the Geneva Proposal, a militant minority of Israelis,
or of Palestinians, or of both, are able to effectively veto an agreement or convince their majority that the internal division such an agreement would create is
too costly to endure. But this is at best only one of three possible explanations
of the impasse, and it is not necessarily the most likely one. At a minimum, the
claim of its centrality needs to be better defended.
Finally, a careful assessment of the ongoing impasse between the Israelis
and Palestinians and any prescriptive recommendations for achieving a finalstatus peace agreement also must differentiate between the impediments to
peace created by the existence of the settlements and of the claimed right of
return and the impediments to peace created by internal divisions over these
issues. It might be the case (although this is by no means certain) that if there
were no Israeli settlements in the West Bank and if no Palestinians demanded a
right of return to Israel, Israel and the Palestinian Authority would be able to
conclude a peace agreement. The claim offered by Mnookin et al., however, is
that the conflicts within Israeli society and within Palestinian society are themselves an impediment to peace. This claim is possibly true, but it is not obviously so.

